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THE NEED FOR A SHARPE
APPELLATE RECORD: WHY A
CLEAR AND COMPLETE RECORD
ON EXPERT QUALIFICATIONS IS
MORE IMPORTANT THAN EVER
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ABSTRACT
In 2019, the Alaska Supreme Court overruled the twenty-year-old precedent
established in State v. Coon that limited appellate review of trial courts’
rulings on the validity and admissibility of scientific evidence in a Daubert
context. In State v. Sharpe, the court rejected the abuse of discretion standard,
instead applying a more stringent de novo review in evaluating the trial courts’
determinations about the reliability of the scientific theory or technique
underlying an expert’s testimony. Sharpe arose from three consolidated cases,
all of which included evidence from the identical type of polygraph test admitted
or excluded based on a single evidentiary hearing on the validity of the
polygraph test. These conflicting and arbitrary outcomes demonstrated the real
capacity for inconsistencies that appellate courts would not have been able to
correct for under the old abuse of discretion standard, highlighting the very
concerns raised by the dissent in Coon. Now, under this more stringent
appellate standard, it is all the more important for practitioners to develop
comprehensive records surrounding scientific evidence. In developing these
trial records, practitioners should look to the supreme court’s analysis in
Sharpe for guidance on some of the most important factors appellate courts
will likely rely on in their review.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In State v. Sharpe,1 the Alaska Supreme Court considered the appeal
of three consolidated criminal cases in which defendants—Thomas
Alexander, Jyzyk Sharpe, and Jeffery Holt—sought to introduce
comparison question technique (CPT) polygraph examinations into
evidence.2 The same expert conducted the CPT examination for each
defendant.3 For each case, the superior court relied on the single, two-day
evidentiary hearing from Alexander’s case regarding the admissibility of
his polygraph examination under the Daubert/Coon-standard.4 Based on
the record from this evidentiary hearing, the court admitted the
polygraph examination in two cases and denied admission in the third.5
When all three cases were appealed, the court of appeals urged the
supreme court to re-examine the standard of review under Daubert/Coon
because application of the standard required affirmation of the superior
court evidentiary rulings in all three cases, despite the inherent
contradiction in affirming all three.6 The supreme court held that
Daubert/Coon determinations of whether the underlying scientific theory
or technique is scientifically valid should be subject to de novo review by
the appellate court.7 In overturning the Coon abuse of discretion standard
for Daubert determinations, the supreme court acknowledged one of its
greatest concerns in Coon regarding the setting of an abuse of discretion
standard: the appellate record.8
This Comment addresses the practical impact of State v. Sharpe for
practitioners. The new standard of review for Daubert-style
determinations requires that trial-level practitioners ensure the record on

1. 435 P.3d 887 (Alaska 2019).
2. Id. at 889–91.
3. Id. at 889.
4. Id. at 890. The Daubert/Coon standard refers to two cases:
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993); and State v. Coon,
974 P.2d 386 (Alaska 1999). In Daubert, the Supreme Court articulated five nonexclusive factors to be used in determining the admissibility of an expert witness’s
scientific testimony. 509 U.S. at 593–95. The Alaska Supreme Court adopted the
Daubert standard in Coon. 974 P.2d at 402.
5. Sharpe, 435 P.3d at 889.
6. Id. at 891–92.
7. Id. at 900.
8. See id. at 899 (“We do not take these concerns lightly: the record on appeal
is limited to the testimony and exhibits in the superior court’s case file, so there is
a non-negligible risk that reviewing the validity of scientific evidence de novo
could lead us or the court of appeals to decide a case involving the admissibility
of scientific evidence based on incomplete information.”).
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appeal is as complete as practicably possible, as the record is now subject
to a more searching review by the appellate court.9 Part II details the case
histories of both State v. Sharpe and its predecessor, State v. Coon. Part III
discusses the important practical impact of State v. Sharpe for trial-level
practitioners and notes key aspects of the record that will likely be
reviewed by appellate courts.

II. CASE DESCRIPTIONS
The supreme court first considered the standard of review for
scientific evidence admitted under Daubert in Alaska state courts in State
v. Coon.10 In Coon, the defendant, George Coon, was found guilty of
making terroristic telephone calls.11 In securing the conviction, the State
retained a voice analysis expert to complete a voice spectrographic
analysis of the calls.12 The expert compared the voice on the answering
machine with voice exemplars provided by Coon.13 On appeal, the
supreme court in Coon faced the issue of whether to adopt the recentlydecided Daubert standard or to retain the previous requirements under
Frye v. United States14 for the admission of scientific evidence through
experts.15 Ultimately, the supreme court adopted the Daubert test,
rejecting Frye as inconsistent with the Alaska Rules of Evidence.16 Further,
the court applied an abuse of discretion standard for reviewing Daubert
rulings, stating that “[s]uch rulings are best left to the discretion of the
trial court.”17
The lone dissenter in Coon, Justice Fabe, concurred in part with the
judgement, agreeing with the majority’s adoption of the Daubert standard
for scientific evidence.18 Justice Fabe further agreed that abuse of
discretion was the correct standard of review with respect to “the
relevance of scientific evidence to particular cases,” but believed the court
adopted the incorrect standard of review for the “validity of such
techniques . . . because the question of a technique’s scientific validity is a
legal issue that normally does not depend on case-sensitive factual
determinations.”19 Further, she warned that the abuse of discretion
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

See infra Part III.
974 P.2d 386 (Alaska 1999).
Id. at 388.
Id.
Id.
293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
Coon, 974 P.2d at 389.
Id. at 395.
Id. at 399.
Id. at 403 (Fabe, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id.
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standard would cause inconsistencies in the admission of scientific
evidence that appellate courts would be unable to resolve.20 The majority
disagreed with this critique, countering that a de novo standard would
not “adequately take account of the reality of the judicial process and the
variable state of science.”21 The majority was particularly concerned that
the record on appeal would not contain adequate and relevant data
regarding the scientific method at issue.22
In Sharpe, the supreme court revisited the Coon standard of review
for the admissibility of scientific evidence under Daubert.23 Sharpe
addressed the three cases, consolidated on appeal, in which the
defendants—Thomas Alexander, Jyzyk Sharpe, and Jeffery Holt—all
sought to admit a comparison question technique polygraph examination
into evidence.24 The superior court held a two-day evidentiary hearing on
the admissibility of Alexander’s polygraph examination, determining
that the evidence met the Daubert/Coon requirements for scientific
validity.25 Subsequently, in Sharpe’s case, the State moved to exclude his
polygraph examination.26 The superior court did not hold a new
evidentiary hearing on Sharpe’s evidence.27 Instead, the court relied on
the record established in Alexander’s evidentiary hearing.28 The court
then admitted the polygraph examination on the basis of the same
reasoning in Alexander.29 A third superior court judge examined the same
record and order from Alexander’s evidentiary hearing to determine the
admissibility of Holt’s polygraph examination.30 On review of the same
record from State v. Alexander,31 the court in State v. Holt32 determined the
evidence was not sufficiently reliable to be admitted and excluded it.33
Parties filed appeals in all three cases.34
The court of appeals affirmed the superior court holding in all three
20. Id. at 404. (“Application of an abuse of discretion standard of review to
the validity of scientific technique w[ould] most likely lead to inconsistent
treatment of similarly situated claims.”).
21. Id. at 399 (majority opinion).
22. See id. (citing State v. Alberico, 861 P.2d 192 (N.M. 1993)) (noting the New
Mexico Supreme Court’s rejection of de novo review of scientific validity with the
same concerns).
23. State v. Sharpe, 435 P.3d 887, 887 (Alaska 2019).
24. Id. at 889–91.
25. Id. at 890.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 891.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. State v. Alexander, No. 3AN-09-11088 CR (Alaska Super. Ct. 2015).
32. State v. Holt, No. 3HO-11-515CR (Alaska Super. Ct. 2014).
33. Sharpe, 435 P.3d at 891.
34. Id. at 891–92.
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cases, finding that there was no abuse of discretion under the Coon
standard but urging the supreme court to reconsider the standard of
review established in Coon. Specifically, the court of appeals underscored
that the deferential standard meant the reviewing court could not correct
discrepancies where reasonable persons can and do differ on evaluating
the validity of scientific evidence.35
On review, the supreme court consolidated Alexander, Sharpe, and
Holt.36 The court considered whether to revisit the abuse of discretion
standard established in Coon, as urged by the court of appeals.37 It held
that the prior standard of review understated the potential for
inconsistent rulings on the admissibility of scientific evidence to a level
that undermined the integrity of the court.38 Noting that Justice Fabe’s
dissent in Coon correctly identified that the abuse of discretion standard
would likely lead to inconsistent application in similar situations, the
court further found that a number of commentators had proposed a
similar standard to Justice Fabe’s critiques.39 While all federal circuits
have adopted the abuse of discretion standard, several state courts have
adopted a “stricter” standard of review.40
In overruling the Coon standard, the supreme court reasoned the
posture of these three cases, which relied on the same evidentiary hearing
and exact same record but arrived at different determinations of
admissibility, precisely demonstrated the inconsistency foreseen by
Justice Fabe.41 The court found it had been too dismissive in Coon of the
potential for inconsistent rulings and the impact those rulings would have
on the integrity of the judicial process.42 In overruling Coon, the court
imposed a new hybrid standard: appellate courts must apply a clear error
standard to preliminary factual determinations but exercise de novo
review when evaluating whether the underlying scientific theories or
techniques are scientifically valid under Daubert.43 This independent
judgment is to be based on “the evidence presented and the scientific
literature available,” subject to de novo review.44
35. Id.
36. Id. at 892. The State and Defendants Shape and Alexander filed crosspetitions to the supreme court. Id. The court of appeals severed and certified the
polygraph question in Holt, as the supreme court had already granted review in
the other two cases. Id. The supreme court accepted certification and consolidated
all three cases. Id.
37. Id. at 893.
38. Id. at 898.
39. Id. at 896.
40. Id. at 897.
41. Id. at 898.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 889–90.
44. Id. at 900.

37.1 LAWS KUCHINSKI FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

124

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

6/29/2020 10:20 PM

37:1

III. ANALYSIS
The supreme court’s ruling in State v. Sharpe will have an important
practical impact for trial-level practitioners who seek to introduce
testimony from experts that must meet Daubert-style criteria. Specifically,
the shift to de novo review will require practitioners to ensure the record
on appeal is as complete as practically possible.45 Under the old abuse of
discretion standard, the state of the record was not as important because
the appellate court conducted a less searching analysis.46 The de novo
review standard, however, obligates the appellate court to conduct a
complete, independent review of the evidence in the record.47 Given the
more intensive nature of this new standard, a comprehensive record is
even more important now than when an abuse of discretion standard
applied.
In initially settling on the abuse of discretion standard, the court in
Coon emphasized the need for a clear and complete record on appeal
under a de novo standard.48 Specifically, the court expressed concern that
the record on appeal cannot be guaranteed to contain all the relevant,
recent data.49 Further, appellate courts might not always have access to
adequate scientific literature when exercising independent review.50 In
rejecting the Coon abuse of discretion standard, the court in Sharpe
acknowledged the same concerns.51 However, the supreme court did not
find the issue dispositive in Sharpe because the trial courts are also limited
to ruling based on information in the record and because appellate courts
would have additional time to review literature independently to
mitigate a poor record.52 Thus, a poor record on appeal is still an issue,
just one that appellate courts can overcome.
45. Id. at 889.
46. Under abuse of discretion, the court will only overturn the trial court’s
decision if it was arbitrary, unreasonable, or absurd. ALASKA COURT SYS., SELFHELP SERVICES: APPEALS (2018), http://www.courts.alaska.gov/shc/appeals/
appellantsopeningbrief.htm#15.
47. Id.
48. See State v. Coon, 974 P.2d 386, 399 (Alaska 1999) (citing State v. Alberico,
861 P.2d 192, 169–70 (N.M. 1993)) (noting the New Mexico Supreme Court’s
rejection of de novo review of Daubert qualifications because the assumption a
clear record on appeal exists is unrealistic).
49. See id. (adopting the reasoning of the New Mexico Supreme Court).
50. See id. (adopting the reasoning of the New Mexico Supreme Court
regarding the risks associated with de novo appellate review of admissions of
scientific evidence where the record lacks adequate scientific literature).
51. State v. Sharpe, 435 P.3d 889, 899 (Alaska 2019) (“[T]here is a nonnegligible risk that reviewing the validity of scientific evidence de novo could lead
us or the court of appeals to decide a case involving the admissibility of scientific
evidence based on incomplete information.”).
52. Id.
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As a result, it is important that trial attorneys create a strong record
for potential appeals. The supreme court’s analysis in Sharpe can serve as
a guide for practitioners in creating such a record.53 The court’s analysis
suggests appellate review will focus on the following key aspects of a
record. First is the experts’ testimony, even when the testimony simply
cited to other studies.54 It is as important as ever to ensure the clarity of
the experts’ testimony at trial. As the court in Coon cautioned, the variance
in experts’ presentation skills can impact courts’ understanding of the
validity of a technique and therefore their decision on whether to admit
evidence as valid.55
Second is the review of academic literature independent of the
literature mentioned by experts or entered into evidence.56 This review of
outside literature suggests that trial courts should be willing to review
additional academic material, at least if it is presented by the parties,
given that trial-level decisions must be made in a short timeframe.57 At a
minimum, practitioners should be aware of the full field of literature and
take measures to respond to literature that counters their position given
that appellate courts may review it, even if opposing counsel does not
introduce it. The peer review factor is the one exception to this willingness
to review outside literature.58 As a result, practitioners must be careful to
introduce any instances of peer review of the method about which they
seek to have an expert testify, although given that this is not grounded in
any specific reasoning, this may be subject to later change.
Finally, the court considered “[o]ther relevant factors,” including the
“danger of a hidden litigation motive” factor in parts of the record that
indicated potential witness bias.59 Practitioners need not do anything
more than prepare for cross examination of their expert as usual, since
witness bias is a common ground for cross examination.60 That said, the

53. Id. at 902–08.
54. The supreme court reviewed the experts’ testimony for every Daubert
factor. Id. at 902–08, 907 nn.147–50.
55. See Coon, 974 P.2d at 399 (quoting language from the New Mexico
Supreme Court’s decision concerning variances in proof of validity of scientific
techniques based on different presentations of such proof).
56. The supreme court reviewed independent academic literature for every
Daubert factor except for peer review. Sharpe, 435 P.3d at 902–08.
57. The supreme court’s ruling suggests appellate courts should review
outside literature when conducting de novo review. Since de novo review is
simply a new review of the trial court’s decision, trial courts should likewise be
able to review outside literature.
58. Sharpe, 435 P.3d at 904 (only mentioning studies cited by the expert). The
peer review factor examines whether the scientific technique has been examined
in peer review studies. Id.
59. Id. at 908.
60. 31A AM. JUR. 2D Expert and Opinion Evidence § 59 (2020).
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supreme court’s analysis suggests citing numerous studies by one’s own
expert can be a double-edged sword. Typically, the fact that a proposed
expert has conducted studies in the area supports her qualification as an
expert.61 Here, however, the supreme court considered the same fact to be
further evidence of the expert’s potential bias.62

IV. CONCLUSION
State v. Sharpe provides important guidance to trial-level
practitioners on preserving a comprehensive record in preparation for a
more rigorous appellate standard of review. Sharpe’s shift to de novo
review means that appellate courts will now conduct a more intensive
review of the record when examining expert qualifications that must meet
a Daubert-style test. Dating back to Coon, the supreme court has expressed
concern about the need for a clear and complete record on appeal.
Helpfully, the supreme court’s de novo review in Sharpe provides
guidance on how to establish such a comprehensive record. First, expert
testimony is always critical to the Daubert analysis. Second, the appellate
courts will review outside academic literature so trial-level practitioners
should be prepared to potentially introduce helpful literature beyond
what was relied upon by their expert and should be prepared to counter
adverse academic literature, even if it is not raised before the trial court
by the opposing party. Finally, the de novo review standard amplifies the
traditional importance of preparing experts for direct and cross
examinations; direct examinations need to be clearer so that appellate
courts can later understand the expert’s importance, and cross
examinations can bring out independent factors the appellate courts may
consider in deciding whether an expert meets the Daubert-style
requirements. Ultimately, by developing these factors considered by the
supreme court in Sharpe, trial-level practitioners can preserve a
comprehensive record ready to withstand a more rigorous standard of
review in a post-Coon appeal.

61. See id. § 40 (2020) (stating expert qualification is based on experts having
superior knowledge of the subject matter to the general public).
62. Sharpe, 435 P.3d at 908.

